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DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY-PROOF OF SPECIAL
DAMAGES NOT REQUIRED
Harwood Pharmacal Co. Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co. Inc.
9 N.Y.2d 460, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725, 174 N.E.2d 602 (1961)
Plaintiff, a manufacturer of a product known as "Snooze," brought
a libel action against defendant alleging that one of the stations' per-
formers displayed an object purporting to be a package of plaintiff's pro-
duct "Snooze" to his audience and said, "Snooze, new aid for sleep. Snooze
is full of all kinds of habit forming drugs. Nothing short of a hospital cure
will make you stop taking Snooze. You'll feel like a run-down hound dog
and lose weight!"' Defendant moved to dismiss "because the allegedly
televised statements were not defamatory per se of plaintiff itself as
distinguished from its product Snooze and no special damages were set
forth.' 2 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion
to dismiss, holding there was libel per se as to plaintiff and therefore
special damages need not be shown.
In Marlin v. Shields, cited by the court, it was held that "where the
libel or slander is of a manufactured article, and does not directly impeach
the integrity, knowledge, skill, diligence or credit of the plaintiff, the words
are not actionable at law unless special damages be alleged and proved."13
While some form of this rule is generally subscribed to in most jurisdictions,
its application has led to considerable difficulty.
Defamatory communications about property have become known as a
separate tort, "disparagement of property," as distinguished from libel.
However, it is not always easy to differentiate the two actions. As evidenced
by decisions, there is a reluctance on the part of courts to allow individuals
to recover for derogatory remarks about their products without a showing
of special damages even where the statements make an indirect reference to
the person connected with the product.4
In March, 1960, the New York court ruled in Drug Research Corp.
v. Curtis Publishing Co. that there was no libel where a magazine article
disparaged a weight-reducing pill produced by plaintiff, because, although
the article mentioned plaintiff's product and charged another corporation
1 Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 460, 462,
214 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726, 174 N.E.2d 602,603 (1961).
2 Ibid.
3 Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 390, 64 N.E. 163, 164 (1902).
The court in this case held that disparagements of the quality, design, and performance
of a rifle manufactured by plaintiff were not libelous per se as to the manufacturer.
While speaking negatively of the firearm, it did not charge the plaintiff with any
deceit in selling or lack of skill in manufacturing the rifle.
4 Dooling v. Budget Publishing Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N.E. 809 (1887). In
this case, the Massachusetts court held that a comment stating that a dinner was served
to which even hungry barbarians might object was not actionable without showing
special damages.
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with improper advertising, there was no defamation of plaintiff itself.
The court in Harwood said "the clear distinction between this case and
Drug Research Corporation, is that this allegedly telecast language could
readily be understood by the television audience as charging the manu-
facturer of "Snooze" with fraud and deceit in putting on the market an
unwholesome and dangerous product." 6
The "clear" distinction noted by the court is not entirely credible.
An article disclaiming and disparaging the value of a reducing pill imputes
the same amount of fraud as does a television statement questioning the
use of a sleeping drug. That the article also questioned the advertising
methods of a company representing the manufacturer, rather than the
manufacturer itself does not seem to be a substantial distinction. If the
court required the showing of special damages in the reducing pill case, it
would seem that the same reasoning should apply in Harwood. As it stands,
the holding is an overextension of the rule laid down in Marlin v. Shields.
A rule similar to that of Marlin v. Shields prevails in Ohio. In Cleveland
Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole,7 the court adopted the rule laid down in
a previous case8 which said that for words to be actionable per se where
such remarks refer to the quality of the product rather than the manu-
facturer, the remarks must infer that plaintiff is guilty of a deceit, mal-
practice or lack of skill in producing the article.9 The Ohio Supreme Court
held that disparaging remarks about a play owned by plaintiff were not
libelous per se and therefore not actionable without a showing of special
damages. This holding seems to have been followed in subsequent Ohio
cases.'
0
5 Drug Research Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 7 N.Y.2d 435, 199 N.Y.S.2d
33, 166 N.E.2d 319 (1960). The magazine article said that the "Wonder Drug
Corporation, in a flood of full page newspaper advertisements heralded an allegedly
new reducing discovery called Regimen, which required no giving up of the foods
you like to eat. In the box . .. of pills, however, were instructions warning you
to avoid heavy gravies, oils, thick soup, rice, spaghetti, jam, jelly, noodles, nuts, ice
cream, potatoes, cake, candy, chocolate, cereal, crackers, cream, custard, bread, butter,
pastry, pudding, sugar, and salt. After an investigation by postal inspectors, officials
of the Wonder Drug Corp. voluntarily signed an affidavit of discontinuance."
6 Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. Inc. 9 N.Y.2d 460, 463,
9 N.Y.S.2d 725, 727, 174 N.E.2d 602, 603 (1961).
7 Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735 (1911).
8 Tobias v. Harlend, 4 Wend. 537 (1830).
9 Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, supra note 7, at 130, 95 N.E. 738.
10 Rudolph v. E. W. Scripps Co., 83 Ohio L. Abs. 538 (1959). The Ohio appellate
court supported its decision on the basis of the opinion in Cleveland Leader Printing Co.
v. Nethersole which, while admitting the difficulty in applying the rule of law to the
particular fact situation and noting apparent inconsistencies in decisions, held the rule
itself to be well established. Where remarks are made about an individual in respect
to his business or profession they may be actionable per se; however, such remarks
are not actionable without a showing of special damages where merely spoken in
disparagement of one's property. In this case a newspaper statement "House Con-
demned; 14 Homeless" does not in itself adversely effect the owner in his occupation
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The policy behind the rule is that a person producing a product
for public consumption should expect criticism intended to inform the people
of the quality and nature of the goods involved. In balancing the interests
of the parties, the public interest and the right of freedom of speech and
press should outweigh the manufacturer's interest in having his product
protected from derogatory statements. Application of the rule does not
necessarily deprive plaintiff of a remedy but merely requires that special
damages be shown to establish his cause of action. Inability to prove
damages will prevent his recovery and in most cases policy considerations
justify this result.
as a painter and repairer of buildings. To recover there must be a showing of special
damages.
